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In an attempt to explore the linkages between corruption
surveys, underreporting corruption experiences and causes of
reluctance to report corruption, this paper provides insight into
solutions applied to mitigate the underreporting risks in
surveying corruption experiences in Croatia. Based on the
Survey on use of public services and public integrity in Croatia
2010, the issue of underreporting corruption is assessed with a
two-fold approach. The study first discusses the survey
methodology applied, where the main concerns were the
willingness of respondents to report corruption and their
perceptions regarding risk of personal data misuse. Potential
reluctance to admit involvement in corruption as a criminal act
might be driven by a fear of subsequent surveillance or
investigation. Further, we investigate the concerns expressed by
respondents regarding the misuse of data and about protecting
anonymity. Survey data were used to analyze citizens' attitudes
and reasons for (not) reporting crime to official institutions. The
analysis focuses on reporting corruption experiences, both
formally and informally. The findings show a very high level of
citizens' opportunism and lack of public trust in institutions that
might impede anti-corruption efforts in Croatia.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper provides insight into solutions applied to mitigate
the underreporting risks in surveying corruption experiences
in Croatia. Based on the Survey on use of public services and pub-
lic integrity1 conducted in Croatia, we have analyzed a selec-
tion of questions and answers related to reporting corruption
experiences. The survey was conducted in the summer of 2010
by face-to-face interviews with Croatian citizens, and provides
data analysis of 3005 questionnaires. The methodology em-
ployed was carefully pre-tested in a pilot survey conducted in
June 2010 on a net sample of 150 respondents. The pilot tested
whether the option of self-administrated responses to ques-
tions related to corruption experiences would increase the re-
sponse rate, and whether the respondents were concerned
about the anonymity of the survey (Budak and Rajh, 2010).
This research adds to the Budak and Rajh (2010) preliminary
study of the pilot survey, which provided rather limited in-
sight into the trust in institutions. Employing the data collec-
ted in the large nationally representative survey, this analysis
extends to the public's confidence in institutions when repor-
ting crime in Croatia.
Adding to the existing literature (Treisman, 2007; Jensen
et al., 2007), when discussing the survey methodology, our main
concerns were the willingness of respondents to report cor-
ruption and their perceived risk of personal data misuse. Po-
tential reluctance to admit involvement in corruption as a
criminal act might be driven by a fear of surveillance or inves-
tigation that might follow. Further, we have investigated the
views expressed by respondents regarding the misuse of da-
ta, in particular with regard to protecting confidentiality. Due
to the topic of the survey, the anonymity of the respondents
was protected more than requested by standard market re-
search procedures.
The issue of underreporting corruption is assessed here
with a two-fold approach. The first one considers respondents'
underreporting corruption experiences in the survey from
the point of view of survey methodology applied. The other
one arises from the direct survey results and refers to the is-
sue of not reporting corruption experiences to official institu-
tions. Thus the results of the survey enabled us to gain inte-
resting insight into the public's trust in institutions in Croatia.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section des-
cribes the rationale for exploring the linkages between exten-
sive corruption surveys, underreporting corruption experi-
ences, and potential causes of reluctance to report corruption
both in surveys and to the institutions. This background leads
us to the main research questions: (i) whether respondents were292
reluctant to answer sensitive questions and why, and (ii) would
Croatian citizens report crime, for what reasons, and which
institutions they trust. The third section deals with the me-
thodology and data used in the corruption survey conducted
in Croatia, while the detailed empirical analysis results are
elaborated in section four. The last section concludes with po-
licy recommendations and suggests possible directions of fur-
ther research.
RATIONALE BACKGROUND
Corruption is a world-wide phenomenon that has raised con-
siderable research interest within the fields of sociological, po-
litical and economic studies. It has been investigated both theo-
retically and empirically from various aspects (Jain, 2001; Tanzi,
1998); however, the true prevalence of corruption still re-
mains unrevealed (Kaufmann, 1997). The clandestine nature
of this illegal activity together with different notions about
what actions should be considered corruption are challeng-
ing researchers and policy makers to improve the methodolo-
gy of corruption-related research (Sampford et al., 2006).
The prevalence of corruption is usually measured by per-
ception indices presenting subjective opinions on the perce-
ived level of corruption.2 Those estimates might be influenced
by general public views, reports on recent corruption scan-
dals, cultural or historical heritage, and are rarely supported
by corruption experiences of the respondents. Complementa-
ry to measuring corruption perceptions, up-to-date surveys
on corruption experiences provide the most effective tool to
get deeper insight into the scope and modes of corrupt activ-
ities. Information on corruption experiences is valuable, yet
would not provide reliable data on the volume of actual cor-
ruption transactions and corresponding financial losses. Esti-
mates reached by extrapolating reported corruption experien-
ces to the whole sector, society group or nation are not accu-
rate since the potential underreporting problem might signi-
ficantly affect results. Further, the real extent of corruption is
not measurable because there is no evidence on how many
corrupt actions committed have ever been revealed. How-
ever, survey data on corruption experiences might serve as a
valuable indication of sources and modes of corruption, thus
enabling anti-corruption strategies to be more precisely targe-
ted and therefore more effective.
This clear objective of exploring both corruption experi-
ences and corruption perceptions has boosted the number of
corruption surveys conducted in the last decade (Treisman, 2007).
Quantitative measurement of corruption experiences in sur-
veys has become popular since more sophisticated and ap-293
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propriate survey methodologies have been applied (Reinikka
and Svensson, 2006). However, the methodology of surveying
corruption is still undergoing critiques, calling for further im-
provements. One of the major issues is the problem of over-
estimating perceived corruption prevalence opposed to the un-
derreported corruption experiences. Underreporting beha-
vior is broadly explained within the cost-benefit theoretical mo-
del, and research studies mostly discuss the problem of under-
reporting in the context of shadow economy (Schneider and
Enste, 2002). There is a body of literature on the factors that
deter people from officially reporting corruption (Zipparo,
1998), yet very few studies on how to deal with this problem
in surveying corruption experiences are available. The recent
study of Jensen et al. (2007) provides a new concept of gath-
ering useful information from nonresponse and false res-
ponse to corruption-related questions in firm-level corrup-
tion surveys, while Reinikka and Svensson (2006) have dis-
cussed how to overcome misreporting problems in surveying
educational and health institutions and firms. Besides the ge-
neral lack of literature on this topic, the above-mentioned
contributions are related to surveying firms and institutions,
and to our knowledge, no such analysis has been made for
surveying the corruption experiences of the general public.
For the latter, it would be interesting to explore the reasons
behind personal reluctance to report corruption.
Citizens in Croatia are aware that living in an informa-
tion society in some segments leads "towards a surveillance
society" (Radovan, 2006). This subjective notion, combined with
memories of the past undemocratic regime, could seriously
prevent respondents from reporting corruption experiences.
Citizens are very much aware that all data and information
collected will be electronically processed and kept for records.
All gathered information could be (mis)used for further sur-
veillance, manipulation and even prosecuting people (Rado-
van and Jugo, 2006). Studies have shown that U.S. citizens
have concerns about privacy and confidentiality even in re-
turning census forms (Singer et al., 2003). A low response rate
can skew the findings of surveys dealing with sensitive is-
sues, such as opinion research about surveillance and privacy
(Haggerty and Gazso, 2005). Survey reporting on corruption
is particularly sensitive because both sides participating in
corruption (bribe-givers and bribe-takers) are subject to crim-
inal prosecution.3 If reported a posteriori, i.e., once a corrup-
tion transaction is realized, there might be fear of consequent
surveillance to gather more evidence on corrupt officials or
even investigation and prosecution. This would not only in-
duce the underreporting of corruption but also increase the
refusal rate and thus bias the survey results.294
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Theoretical thought underpins trust in the institutions as
a key component of social capital (Nooteboom, 2007; Berg-
gren and Jordahl, 2006). As public opinion is a product of so-
cial capital and institutional set-up, a notable portion of pub-
lic opinion about corruption and other forms of crime is being
formed according to citizens' confidence in the institutions
that should ensure their security. A part of the survey collects
data on sharing information about corruption experiences and
reporting them. It provides a unique source of information
about real and perceived trust in institutions responsible for
dealing with corruption. Public awareness about corruption
represents an important pillar of anti-corruption efforts. If the
attitudes of citizens are not clearly in line with the promoted
zero tolerance towards corruption, room is made for acts of
corruption to emerge.
Several studies on trust in institutions in Croatia (Balo-
ban and Rimac, 1999; Štulhofer, 2004) refer to the past period
(1997 and 1995 to 2003, respectively). In light of the increased
number of corruption scandals and intensified efforts to com-
bat corruption in Croatia, one could suppose that general pu-
blic views on both corruption and institutions have changed.
Further, previous research dealt either with a general sense of
trust or trust in various kinds of institutions, while there was
no particular focus on anti-corruption agencies and institu-
tions.
Notwithstanding that both informal and formal institu-
tions4 shape public attitudes towards corruption, in our em-
pirical research we have collected data on trust in formal in-
stitutions (agencies enforcing legislative anti-corruption mea-
sures). The surveyed corruption experiences refer to bribes ci-
tizens gave to public employees in money, goods or counter-
-favors above the official cost of the public service. Our focus
on these aspects of corruption and associated trust in institu-
tions was driven by the conceptual development of the sur-
vey methodology, which is described in the following section.
METHODOLOGY OF SURVEYING CORRUPTION IN CROATIA
Assessing corruption perceptions and corruption experiences
was part of the Survey on use of public services and public integri-
ty for which the pilot testing was conducted in Croatia in June
2010. The net sample size for the pilot was 150 respondents of
age 18 to 64. The pilot survey was conducted by face-to-face
interviews in three different regions of Croatia (urban and ru-
ral areas of Zagreb, Osijek and Split). Towns were divided in
homogenous areas e.g. center, first ring. The sample was de-
fined by random selection of addresses/households and ran-
dom selection of respondents. The interviewer had to choose295
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the member of the household to be interviewed with the help
of the birthday key.
The main survey followed in July and August 2010 on a
nationally representative sample of 3005 Croatian citizens aged
18 to 64. We employed the same methodology as in the pilot
survey. A nationally representative sample is made on a two-
-way stratification by six regions (formed by grouping coun-
ties) and four types of settlements. Four types of settlements
differ according to size, and correspond to the local adminis-
trative system in Croatia. Settlements up to 10,000 inhabitants
have the status of municipality, and settlements above 10,000
inhabitants have a status of town. The sample allocated to
each stratum is proportional to the population living in each
stratum. Towns and villages selected in the sample are further
divided into areas and in each area starting points for walks
were randomly selected. 196 starting points were used for the
interviewer's walks. During the fieldwork, based on precisely
defined standard procedures, the sample is further defined
by: random selection of addresses/households and random
selection of respondents (household member of age 18 to 64
with the help of birthday key). Double-check assurance of
data collection from the nationally representative sample is
provided by noting to the interviewers provisional quotas re-
quired (by sex and age brackets for each of 196 interviewers'
starting points). Percentages in each stratum in total population
(according to Census 2001, for age group 18-64) and those a-
chieved in the sample are closely corresponding (Table 1).
Population (%) Sample (%)
Region Zagreb 25.3 24.9
North Croatia 15.7 16.1
Slavonia 19.7 19.4
Lika, Kordun, Banovina 8.3 9.0
Istria, Hrvatsko Primorje, Gorski Kotar 11.9 11.8
Dalmatia 19.1 18.8
Settlement Size Up to 2.000 39.5 38.5
2.001-10.000 16.3 16.0
10.001-100.000 21.4 21.5
More than 100.000 22.8 24.0
Gender Male 49.6 47.4
Female 50.4 52.6
Age 18-30 27.9 28.0
31-50 45.9 44.5
51-64 26.2 27.6
Source: For population, Census 2001.
DRU[. ISTRA@. ZAGREB
GOD. 21 (2012),
BR. 2 (116),
STR. 291-313
BUDAK, J., RAJH, E.:
CORRUPTION SURVEY...
 TABLE 1
Comparison of
population and
sample characteristics
On average, interviewers did 1.12 visits per household and
spent 33.47 minutes with respondent for successfully finished
interviews. In order to achieve a nationally representative
sample, the net sample size was set to 3000 respondents, which
gives the standard error of estimate of around a low 1%. As
the fieldwork had to run until the target number of 3000 filled
questionnaires was reached, we achieved 3005 interviews
and a posteriori calculated the response rate of 50.2%.
The first step in convincing respondents to participate in
the survey was to secure overall confidence in the project. A
cover letter used in the pilot as well as in the main survey poin-
ted out the distinguished partners in the project (legally neu-
tral international institutions and local research experts). Fur-
ther, respondents were informed that the data collected would
be treated confidentially and the respondents would remain
anonymous. Their personal data were collected on the sepa-
rate paper sheet. Respondents optionally provided their con-
tacts to be used for the fieldwork back-check (Table 2).
N %
Interview subject to Back-check / Control Yes 960 31.9
No 2045 68.1
Method of Back-check / Control Back-check in person 60 6.3
Back-check by telephone 900 93.8
In the introductory letter, the project was presented as an
effort to collect information on citizens' experiences with pu-
blic services. The aim of the survey was to explore public inte-
grity as a whole and to examine experiences of crime victim-
ization. As corruption was indeed only a part of the Survey
on use of public services and public integrity, it allowed us to
not mention corruption explicitly in the pilot survey cover
letter. Disclosing the entire purpose of the survey, although
legitimate and meaningful, could have raised the concerns of
the respondents: "The objective is to collect information that
will assist the Government... in fighting crime, inter alia, by
combating corruption." Respondents however could avoid sen-
sitive corruption experience questions in the related parts of
the survey ("No answer" option provided).
This potential obstacle was resolved by raising the com-
petence of interviewers in clarifying and elaborating on how
the collected information would be kept and processed. The
risk of personal data being misused was minimized by using
separate locations for data processing and analysis. As con-
tracted, the market research agency conducting the survey on
site should deliver an electronic database, but the original297
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 TABLE 2
Fieldwork control
statistics
questionnaires should not be made available to the institution
reporting the aggregate survey results. Regardless of which
side the initiative comes from (citizen offering a bribe or pub-
lic official asking for a bribe), both sides involved in a corrupt
activity legally are considered to have committed a criminal
act. A final measure of security assurance involved checking
with the anti-corruption agencies in Croatia that there was no
legislative possibility of evidence being requested regarding
the personal accounts of corruption in the survey.
In designing the questionnaire, one had to consider that
the respondents would be aware that their participation in
corrupt transactions might discredit their integrity. Therefore
the wording of the questions about personal corruption expe-
riences implied that the initiative did not come from the re-
spondents (e.g., "... you had to give a gift", "... you had to make
such an extra payment"). This solution was expected to relieve
the sense of guilt and consequently to encourage respondents
to provide true answers to sensitive questions.
The questionnaire was structured in eight sections. Sec-
tion 1 collected opinions on selected topics regarding the pro-
blems facing Croatia today, perceptions on corruption preva-
lence and attitudes towards corruption phenomena. Experien-
ces with public services and citizens' satisfaction in contacts
with various civil servants and public officials were examined
in section 2. Bribery experiences were questioned in section 3.
Specifically, respondents were asked about their recent per-
sonal involvement in corruption acts, types of bribery and
related purpose. For those who had had corruption experi-
ences in the last 12 months, we were interested to know whe-
ther they had reported the cases of corruption and what the
outcomes were. Other practices such as corruption related to
elections or public sector hiring practices as well as opinions
on the integrity of public officials were surveyed in section 4.
Reasons for (not) reporting corruption and trust in institu-
tions were explored in section 5 of the questionnaire. Section
6 represented a victimization survey, asking about experien-
ces of car theft, burglary, personal theft, assault, theft, and rob-
bery. General information on the respondent's sex, age, edu-
cation, occupation, and income was collected in section 7. The
last section, section 8, contained an interview evaluation by
the interviewer, indicating the respondent's remarks during
or after the interview. Given the described questionnaire struc-
ture, we have selected those questions and answers that give
us insight into confidentiality issues of the survey and report-
ing corruption. The original formulations of the questions rel-
evant for this study are listed in the Appendix, with a refer-
ence of the question number in brackets of the text.298
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS
Pilot Survey Solutions to Confidentiality Issues
Already in the pilot survey, an important methodological con-
cern was resolved as no major quitting problem had been
observed in the corruption experience section of the question-
naire. One could suppose at that point that the respondents
felt confident due to the carefully developed questionnaire
and professionally trained interviewers.
At the end of the pilot interview, respondents had an op-
portunity to give blank remarks on the survey. Out of a total
of 150 pilot survey respondents, 16 percent gave additional
remarks. Most of the remarks were concerns expressed regar-
ding the future use of the results, followed by concerns re-
garding the confidentiality of the survey. Few respondents
were worried about the potential misuse of the victimization
part of the survey data (whether information on home secu-
rity would be abused by burglars), indicating that a possible
leakage of data collected has been perceived as a problem. The
pilot testing results conclusively supported the survey ques-
tionnaires and methodology developed. No problems arose
related to the sensitive questions on corruption experiences,
and some confidentiality issues proved to be irrelevant for
the response rate. Since no differences have been observed in
responses by face-to-face interview vs. partial self-administra-
tion of the questionnaire, this particular confidentiality issue
could be disregarded.
Over 17 percent of respondents claimed they had recent
corruption experiences, and provided further details on those
transactions. We proceed to the empirical analysis of survey
results on reporting corruption experiences and related trust
in the institutions in Croatia.
Survey Results on Reporting Corruption
In order to better understand the current situation and to frame
the context of the survey, several introductory questions were
posed. According to the respondents, unemployment (26 per-
cent) and poor performance of the Government (24 percent)
are considered to be the major problems that Croatia is facing to-
day, which is understandable given the economic crisis [Q1.1].
Corruption is a major problem in Croatia for 24 percent of
respondents and according to public perceptions there are no
signs of improvement. On the contrary, 44 percent of respon-
dents think the level of corruption has remained the same, while
47 percent believe corruption has increased in the last three
years [Q1.8].299
Although the perceived level of corruption is still rather
high, the actual experiences of Croatian citizens show promi-
sing outcomes. 86 percent of respondents who had contacts
with public employees in the last 12 months [Q2.1] did not have
to give any gift, counter-favor or extra money to a civil servant
or public official [Q3.1] (Table 3). Of those who had recent cor-
ruption experiences, in 92 percent of the cases respondents
claimed they had given such a gift to doctors and/or nurses
[Q3.2]. In contacts with health sector employees it is general-
ly considered a custom for the patient to offer a small thank-
-you gift (a packet of coffee or a box of chocolate), and such
gifts usually do not substantially determine the accessibility
of health services or their quality. To a lesser extent bribes were
given to police officers (30 percent of corruption cases) and
for car registration (14 percent). It is worth noticing that in most
of those cases the incentive came from the bribe-giver [Q3.8]
who voluntarily offered a bribe to avoid fines, for example. Ne-
gligible corruption experiences have been reported in contacts
with custom officers, public utility services, tax authorities,
local government, social protection services, teachers and pro-
fessors, judges and prosecutors, or cadastre officers (5 to 20
individual cases per public service sector) [Q3.2].
Don't
Yes No remember
Q3.1. Please consider all the contacts you had with a civil servant/
public official in the last 12 months: did it happen that you had to
give to any of them a gift, a counter-favor or some extra-money, 11 86 3
including through an intermediary (with the exclusion of the correct
amount of official fees)?
From the selected questions and the distribution of ans-
wers, one could tell that reporting on corruption experiences
in our survey posed no problem to the respondents in gene-
ral. Yet, of 296 of the total respondents who had a recent cor-
ruption experience, only 2 percent reported the case formally
to the police, State Attorney's Office / USKOK, anti-corruption
body or ombudsperson.
When asked why they did not report the personal cor-
ruption experience to relevant institutions [Q3.14], half of the
respondents stated they had gained benefits from the bribe or
had given the bribe as a sign of gratitude (Figure 1). Further,
24 percent of the respondents do not believe that anything
useful would be done upon reporting. This last statement is sup-
ported by the bitter experience of several respondents who
have submitted reports on corruption experiences, but with
no results. Out of the total six citizens' reports submitted on300
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 TABLE 3
Prevalence of bribery
based on respondents
who had contact with
public employees in
the last 12 months
(N=2592) [Q3.1], in %
corruption experiences, five haven't had any follow-up by of-
ficials [Q3.13]. Moreover, a fear of reprisal was a reason for wor-
ry for 3 percent of respondents [Q3.14].
Besides a very high level of opportunism, those statements
indicate there might be a substantial distrust in the institutions
regarding their willingness and efficiency to fight corruption.
However, some people tend to share their corruption experi-
ences informally, either because they feel as victims or to ad-
vise someone to give a bribe as a way to solve a problem. 71
percent of participants in corruption acts did talk about them
with their family or friends. None of them talked to NGOs and
only one person reported the case of corruption to the media.
29 percent did not talk about it to anybody [Q3.15]. Although
their reasons remain unknown, assumed reasons such as feel-
ing embarrassed, concern of moral judgement, and fear of per-
secution, public investigation or criminalization might deter
people from reporting corruption, formally and informally.
Public Views on Reporting Corruption and Trust in Institutions
Better insight into the aforementioned issues is provided by
the survey results on reporting hypothetic corruption experi-
ences. Regardless of whether respondents had personal cor-
ruption experiences or not, their views about reporting corruption
strongly support two worrying assumptions. More than half
of all respondents in the total sample think that people who
report corruption are likely to regret it (55 percent of respon-
dents fully agree and agree), and that sometimes corruption
is the only way to get things done (53 percent). In line with the
prevailing opinion, the simple majority of respondents disagrees
or fully disagrees with the three other statements (Table 2)
[Q5.1].301
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 FIGURE 1
Reasons for not
reporting personal
corruption experience
(N=290; only respon-
dents who had a
corruption experience
in the last 12 month
but did not report it;
[Q3.11; Q 3.12])
Fully agree Disagree and
Statement Attitude and agree (%) fully disagree (%)
People who report corruption
are likely to regret it Intimidated 55 40
Sometimes corruption is the only way to get
things done Affirmative 53 44
There is no point in reporting corruption
because nothing useful will be done about it Resigned 47 51
Nobody knows where to report corruption acts Not interested 44 52
It is common practice to pay or give gifts,
why should I report? Dismissive 31 67
Respondents' attitudes towards each of the statements about
reporting corruption are classified in five descriptive cate-
gories (intimidated, affirmative, resigned, not interested, and
dismissive). If it is the widespread perception of the popula-
tion that people reporting corruption would most likely regret
it afterwards, one could assume that citizens sharing this o-
pinion would not report corruption. Although the survey da-
ta did not enable us to get into the background reasons for an
"intimidated" attitude, one could assume that the regret to which
the respondents were referring is related to nuisance (such as
media exposure, complicated follow-up procedures, formal in-
vestigation, and testimony at court) and/or fear (of reprisal or
criminalization).
An "affirmative" attitude is shared by 53 percent of respon-
dents who see corruption as a mechanism to ensure the deli-
very of public services. Corruption functioning as a grease in
the wheel in conditions of inefficient public administration
has been well examined in the literature, since the early works
of Leff (Leff, 1964). However, there is a wide consensus about
the adverse effects of corruption prevailing (Mauro, 1995; Tan-
zi, 1998). Fighting the greasing wheel of corruption is related
to improving public administration efficiency, which is the
focus of interest of any good governance policy. In the con-
text of this study, however, respondents would not report cor-
ruption because they either approve it as a state of fact or
they feel helpless in contacts with a growing bureaucracy. Cor-
ruption practices revealed by the survey are in favor of the
first statement. Corruption cases surveyed revealed remark-
able opportunism of bribe-givers (bribes were given as a sign
of gratitude, to by-pass the costs, to avoid fines, to get extra be-
nefits, etc.). Corruption acts initiated by the bribe-givers ex-
plain the affirmative attitude towards corruption as a tool to
"resolve issues".302
 TABLE 4
General attitudes on
reporting corruption
(N=3005; omitted
values refer to "I don't
know" answers (4.5
percent); [Q5.1])
The majority of respondents disagreed with the last three
statements on reporting corruption (Table 4). The largest majo-
rity of respondents reject the statement that corruption is not
worth reporting because bribing is common practice. The
counter-opinion (shared by 31 percent of respondents) might
look similar to the interest-driven "affirmative" view, but the
"dismissive" attitude is substantially different. Whereas the
former approves committing bribes for the personal gain of
the bribe-giver, the latter might consider gifts a harmless and
trivial common practice. This explanation is supported by the
survey data on the practice of giving small thank-you gifts to
doctors and nurses. For the encouraging majority of respon-
dents who would not tolerate giving bribes or gifts and conse-
quently would report such immoral behavior, zero tolerance
to corruption is observed. This might be attributed to the re-
cently intensified combat against corruption in Croatia.
About half of the respondents are in favor of the state-
ments that (i) corruption is not worth reporting because noth-
ing useful will be done about it, and (ii) people are not in-
formed about where to report cases of corruption. These ob-
servations call for careful rethinking on the role and efficiency
of the official institutions. People in Croatia might be resigned
and disappointed with the course of the combat against cor-
ruption. As large corruption scandals were revealed, the in-
vestigation and prosecution that followed may not be seen as
efficient and fast enough from the public point of view. The
evidenced "missing information on where to report corrup-
tion" reflects people's ignorance and lack of interest to report
corruption. Citizens do have the possibility to report corrup-
tion to a number of institutions. They can liberally choose whe-
ther to contact official anti-corruption agencies via phone, e-mail,
fax, mail, in person, or anonymously. Such contact numbers
are provided by the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Inte-
rior, USKOK Office,5 Transparency International Croatia, tax
authorities, and many others.6 Reporting corruption to the
police is within the reach of every Croatian citizen.
When asked which institutions they would report poten-
tial corruption to in the future [Q5.2], the respondents' first
choice was the police (28 percent), followed by the State At-
torney's Office and USKOK (16 percent). Since USKOK is well
known as a special office for fighting corruption and orga-
nized crime within the State Attorney's Office, the police and
USKOK seem to be the natural choices as official institutions
to deal with reported corruption. 14 percent of total respon-
dents would report the case to the supervisor of the corrupt
public official, thus expressing their confidence in internal an-
ti-corruption procedures rather than in official crime-fighting
institutions (Figure 2).303
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In the victimization part of the survey, respondents de-
scribed their recent exposure to various types of crime other
than corruption. In the last five years, most of the crimes re-
ferred to personal theft (10 percent) [Q6.17], assaults or threats
(7 percent) [Q6.21], burglary (4 percent) [Q6.7], robbery (3 per-
cent) [Q6.11], and car theft (1 percent) [Q6.2] (Table 5).
Don't Don't
Over the past five years (since July 2005) Yes No remember have car
Q6.2 ...have you or other members of your household
had any of their cars/vans/trucks stolen when nobody
was in the vehicle? 0.9 69.9 0.2 28.9
Q6.7 ...did anyone actually get into your house or flat
without permission and steal or try to steal something? 4.4 95.3 0.2
I am not including here thefts from garages, sheds or lock-ups.
Q6.11 ...has anyone stolen, or tried to steal, something from
you by using force or threatening you? 2.5 97.1 0.4
Q6.17 There are different types of theft of personal property,
such as pick-pocketing or theft of a purse, wallet, clothing,
jewelry, mobile phone or sports equipment. This can happen 10.3 89.1 0.5
at one's work, at school, in a pub, on public transport, on the
beach, or in the street. ...have you personally been the victim
of any of these incidents?
Q6.21 ...apart from the incidents just covered, have you been
personally attacked or threatened by someone in a way that
really frightened you either at home or elsewhere, such 6.7 92.8 0.4
as in a pub, in the street, at school, on public transport, or
at your workplace?
As shown in Figure 3, Croatian citizens are willing to re-
port those types of crime to the police. Car theft was always
reported to the police, probably for insurance and deregistra-
tion needs [Q6.6]. Burglary [Q6.10], and robbery [Q6.16], were304
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 FIGURE 2
First choice institutions
to report potential
corruption experience
in the future,
N=3005
 TABLE 5
Experience of
victimization
(N=3005), in %
reported in about two thirds of the cases, most likely when
significant damage occurred. Half of the total personal theft
cases were reported [Q6.20], presumably depending on the
loss. Assaults and threats were reported to a smaller extent
[Q6.24].
This research evidenced a strong reluctance of citizens to
report corruption to official institutions for various (more or
less) rational reasons. The police and USKOK are perceived as
the most trustworthy institutions to report corruption in Cro-
atia, and the police stands as the primary institution to con-
tact when reporting other forms of crime in Croatia.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Corruption is widespread in Croatia and curbing corruption
is one of the major tasks of the Croatian government on its
path of accession to the European Union (Budak, 2006). Sur-
veying Croatian citizens about the integrity of public services
as well as examining public opinions on perceptions and cor-
ruption experiences are expected to strengthen anti-corruption
efforts.7
Therefore it is of the utmost importance not only to con-
duct surveys, but to convince respondents – ordinary citizens
– to provide honest and sincere answers to sensitive questions.
This issue has been identified in the existing empirical research
literature on corruption (Treisman, 2007), but has not been
addressed in the context of misuse of personal data of respon-
dents and taking into account the potential risk of surveillance.
In this regard, assessing the risk of data leakage and misuse
that could lead to greater underreporting of corruption expe-
riences in surveys was for us rather limited. The confidence in
ICT technologies used in the survey process leaves room for fu-
ture research as well.305
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 FIGURE 3
Reporting rates per
type of crime in
croatia (bribery
experience refers to
cases in the last 12
months, reported to
official institutions;
other forms of crime
refer to experiences in
the last 36 months,
reported to the police)
It seems that the described methodology of survey did
not influence the possible underreporting of corruption expe-
riences. Of course, one cannot ever tell if and to what extent
the corruption experiences have been underreported or drive
conclusions on the real corruption numbers. A major concern
of respondents, even in limited scope, has been expressed re-
garding the final and true purpose for which the data will be
used afterwards. This intuitively indicates a lack of trust in
the institutions rather than fear of being surveilled. It also re-
veals (but to a modest extent) a fear of whether the personal
data provided in the survey would remain anonymous, al-
though the anonymity of the respondents was protected more
than requested by standard market research procedures.
Survey data provided insight into Croatian citizens' eve-
ryday experiences in contacts with the public sector. Our uni-
que focus on corruption experiences and related reporting is-
sues portrayed to some extent whether people in Croatia feel
secure in this cumbersome area and properly protected by the
responsible institutions. The significant reluctance to report
corruption observed in Croatia can be mainly attributed to
the very high level of opportunism and lack of trust in the in-
stitutions. About two thirds of respondents with corruption
experiences think that corruption is a standard form of beha-
vior, and the simple majority of all respondents consider it po-
intless to report corruption to official institutions. The main
scope of this paper is explaining specific methodological issues
in surveying corruption. The research does not provide an in-
depth empirical analysis of the micro-data collected in the sur-
vey. Although further analysis is needed to derive compre-
hensive anti-corruption measures, the findings of this study
offer some policy recommendations.
Policy implications to combat corruption should primari-
ly be targeted at strengthening anti-corruption awareness, i.e.,
changing public attitudes. In eliminating administrative cor-
ruption, it is of the utmost importance to convince citizens
that even a small thank-you gift should be considered corrup-
tion, and that any form of corrupt activity seriously distorts
accessibility to public services. Administrative "petty" corrup-
tion goes hand in hand with "grand" political corruption and
they interchangeably form a vicious circle of systemic cor-
ruption in the society. Carefully designed public campaigns,
promoting current efforts of anti-corruption institutions to
the media and citizens, and more widely publicizing corrup-
tion hotlines and addresses for reporting corruption (in parti-
cular in rural regions and among elderly people), would con-
tribute to the success of anti-corruption efforts and to build-
ing public trust in the institutions. Strict implementation and
monitoring of ethical codes of conduct in public administra-306
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tion would benefit the eradication of administrative corrup-
tion as well. Once citizens witness more corruption-free pub-
lic services, their perceptions of the overall corruption preva-
lence in Croatia will consequently become lower.
APPENDIX
The questions relevant for this study
Q1.1 In your opinion, what are the most important problems that Croatia is facing today?
(Please mark up to three items, ranking from 1 (most important) to 3 (least important))
 Performance of Croatian Government
Building a functioning public administration
Corruption
Condition of infrastructures (transport, communication, energy, etc.)
Poverty / Low standard of living
Unemployment
Poor performance of education system
Environmental degradation
Crime and insecurity
Relations between ethnic groups
Other (please specify: ...)
Q1.8 Compared to 3 years ago, do you think that the overall level of corruption in Croatia has
increased or decreased? (Please mark one answer only)
Increased
Stable
Decreased
Q2.1 In the last 12 months, have you ever had contacts with any of the following civil ser-
vants/public officials, including through an intermediary, for example to use a public service,
to ask for information/assistance, to request a document, or while processing an administra-
tive procedure? (Please mark each row)
Contact
Police officers Yes No
Judges/Prosecutors Yes No
Cadastre officers Yes No
Tax/revenues officers Yes No
Customs officers Yes No
Public utilities officers (electricity, telephone, etc.) Yes No
Municipal or provincial officers Yes No
Doctors (from public sector) Yes No
Nurses (from public sector) Yes No
Teacher/Professors (from public sector) Yes No
Social protection agency/ministry officers (pensions, allowances, etc.) Yes No
Car registration/driving license agency officers Yes No
Municipal or provincial elected representatives (mayor, town councils, etc.) Yes No
Members of Parliament Yes No
Members of Government Yes No
Non-government organizations (NGOs) Yes No
Embassy/consulate officers of foreign countries Yes No
Other public official (………………………….) Yes No
Q3.1 Please consider all the contacts you had with a civil servant/public official in the last 12
months: did it happen that you had to give to any of them a gift, a counter-favor or some extra-
-money, including through an intermediary (with the exclusion of the correct amount of offi-
cial fees)? (Please mark one answer only)
 Yes
No
Don't remember
No answer
Q3.2 To whom and how many times did you have to give a gift, any goods or some extra-mo-
ney in the last 12 months, including through an intermediary (with the exclusion of the correct
amount of official fees)? (Please mark all that apply, and specify number of occasions)
Payment/gift was given
Police officers Yes No
Judges/Prosecutors Yes No
Cadastre officers Yes No
Tax/revenues officers Yes No
Customs officers Yes No
Public utilities officers (electricity, telephone, etc.) Yes No
Municipal or provincial officers Yes No
Doctors (from public sector) Yes No
Nurses (from public sector) Yes No
Teacher/Professors (from public sector) Yes No
Social protection agency/ministry officers Yes No
Car registration/driving license agency officers Yes No
Municipal or provincial elected representatives (mayor, town councils, etc.) Yes No
Members of Parliament Yes No
Members of Government Yes No
Non-government organizations (NGOs) Yes No
Embassy/consulate officers of foreign countries Yes No
Other public official (………………..) Yes No
Q3.8 Last time that you had to make such extra payment or gift, how did you understand that
an extra payment or gift was expected? (Please mark only one answer)
Explicit request from the public official
The public official made you understand that a payment was expected
A third person requested the extra payment
Nobody asked for it, I did it to facilitate/accelerate the procedure
Don't remember
Q3.11 Last time that you had to make such extra payment or gift, did you report it to any offi-
cial authority/institution (e.g. police, prosecutor, anti-corruption agency, etc.)? (Please mark
only one answer)
Yes
No
Q 3.12 If Yes, whom did you report to? (Please mark only one answer)
Police
State Attorney Office/USKOK
Anti-Corruption Agency
Ombudsperson
Same agency/institution of the officer requesting bribe, please specify: (……………….)
Other office, please specify: (……………….)
I don't know
Q3.13 What happened after your reporting? (Please mark only one answer)
 A formal procedure was started against the officer
The problem was solved informally and I was given back the money/gift
I was advised not to go ahead with my report
There was no follow-up to my report
Don't know
Q3.14 If Not, why didn't you report? (Please mark only one answer)
It is a common practice to pay or give gifts, why should I report?
It is useless, nobody would care about it
Don't know whom I should report to
Fear of reprisal
I received a benefit from the payment/gift
I made payment/gift as a sign of gratitude
Other reason, please specify: (……………….)
Q3.15 Last time that you had to make such extra payment or gift, did you talk about it with:
(Please mark all that apply)
Friend or relative of yours
Journalist/media
NGO
Other person, please specify: (……………….)
No, with nobody
Q5.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statements below on reporting cor-
ruption? (Please mark each row: Fully agree; Agree; Disagree; Fully disagree, Don't know)
It is a common practice to pay or give gifts, why should I report
There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it
People who report corruption are likely to regret it
Sometimes corruption is the only way to get things done
Nobody knows where to report on corruption acts
Q5.2 If in the future you had to report a case where you were requested to pay some extra
money or give a gift to a public official, who would you report it to? (Please mark up to three
items, ranking from 1 (most important) to 3 (least important)).
Supervisor to the official (in the same organization of the officer requesting the bribe)
Police
State Attorney Office/USKOK
Anti-Corruption Body
Ombudsperson
Journalist/media
Anti-corruption NGO
Other person, please specify: (……………….)
Nobody
I don't know
Q6.2 Over the past five years (since July 2005), have you or other members of your household
had any of their cars/vans/trucks stolen when nobody was in the vehicle?
Yes
No
Don't remember
Q6.7 Over the past 5 years (since July 2005), did anyone actually get into your house or flat
without permission and steal or try to steal something? I am not including here thefts from
garages, sheds or lock-ups.
 Yes
No
Don't remember
Q6.11 Over the past 5 years (since July 2005), has anyone stolen, or tried to steal, something
from you by using force or threatening you?
Yes
No
Don't remember
Q6.17 There are different types of theft of personal property, such as pick-pocketing or theft
of a purse, wallet, clothing, jewellery, mobile phone or sports equipment. This can happen at
one's work, at school, in a pub, on public transport, on the beach, or in the street. Over the past
5 years (since July 2005), have you personally been the victim of any of these incidents?
Yes
No
Don't remember
Q6.21 Apart from the incidents just covered, have you over the past five years (since July 2005)
been personally attacked or threatened by someone in a way that really frightened you either
at home or elsewhere, such as in a pub, in the street, at school, on public transport, or at your
workplace?
Yes
No
Don't remember
Q6.6, Q6.10, Q.6.16, Q6.20, Q6.24 The last time did you or anyone else report the incident to
the police?
Yes
No
Don't know
NOTES
1 This research stemmed from the project Household survey on experi-
ence of corruption and other forms of crime in Croatia, which was based
on a grant agreement between the Institute of Economics, Zagreb
and UNODC. The views and results presented in this paper, however,
are the authors' responsibility only.
2 Two widely used corruption perception measures are Corruption
Perceptions Index of Transparency International (http://www.trans
parency.org) and Control of Corruption as one of the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (developed by the World Bank Institute,
http://www.worldbank.org).
3 Croatia has ratified international anti-corruption conventions and
harmonized national legislation accordingly; corruption is treated as
a criminal act.
4 For a definition of institutions see North, 1990.310
5 Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime.
6 http://www.antikorupcija.hr.
7 Even though the survey reveals "petty" administrative corruption
and does not capture "grand" political corruption.
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Ispitivanje korupcije u Hrvatskoj:
povjerljivost ankete i povjerenje
u institucije
Jelena BUDAK, Edo RAJH
Ekonomski institut, Zagreb
Rad polazi od dosadašnje literature o anketama o korupciji,
metodološkom problemu odbijanja odgovora o stvarnim
iskustvima korupcije te o potencijalnim uzrocima
neprijavljivanja korupcije. Studija opisuje konkretnu
problematiku u anketnom ispitivanju korupcije i primijenjena
rješenja kako bi se smanjio rizik davanja odgovora koji
podcjenjuju stvarna korupcijska iskustva građana. Na
temelju Ankete o korištenju javnih usluga i poštenju u javnim
službama, provedene u Hrvatskoj 2010. godine, u radu se
problem neprijavljivanja korupcije razmatra sa dva stajališta.
Najprije se analizira spremnost anketiranih da potvrde svoje
sudjelovanje u korupcijskom djelu i razloge odbijanja
davanja odgovora. U radu se ispituje percepcija rizika
zlouporabe osobnih podataka i mišljenje ispitanika o zaštiti
anonimnosti. Prema anketnim podacima obrađuju se stavovi312
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ispitanika i razlozi neprijavljivanja kriminala službenim
institucijama. Zasebno se analiziraju formalno i neformalno
prijavljivanje korupcije. Rezultati ankete pokazuju visoku
razinu oportunizma građana i manjak povjerenja u
institucije, što može biti zapreka učinkovitoj provedbi
antikorupcijske politike u Hrvatskoj.
Ključne riječi: metodologija anketiranja, korupcijska iskustva,
povjerenje u institucije, prijavljivanje kaznenih djela,
Hrvatska
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